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“These people [independent directors], decent and intelligent
though they were, simply did not know enough about business
and/or care enough about shareholders to question foolish acquisitions
or egregious compensation.”
Warren E. Buffett1
I. INTRODUCTION
Over the past decade, corporate finance scholarship has increasingly
focused on the private benefits agency problem, also termed tunneling,
self-dealing, or private benefits of control. Coined by Johnson, La Porta,
Lopez-de-Silanes and Shleifer (2000), “tunneling” refers to the extraction of
private benefits by controlling shareholders at the expense of noncontrolling shareholders, or “the transfer of resources out of a company
to its controlling shareholder.” 2 It is evident that public companies
outside the United States and the United Kingdom typically have a
controlling shareholder who controls the firm often without proportionate
shareholdings. 3 The divergence between control rights and cash-flow
rights makes the firm more prone to tunneling by controlling shareholders,
thus hampering investors’ confidence over market integrity and hindering
national capital market development. Therefore, one of the most important
challenges in modern corporate governance is to constrain extraction of
private benefits by controlling shareholders.

1. WARREN E. BUFFETT, BERKSHIRE HATHAWAY INC., 2002 ANNUAL
REPORT 17 (2003), available at http://www.berkshirehathaway.com/letters/letters.html.
2. Simon Johnson, Rafael La Porta, Florencio Lopez-de-Silanes & Andrei Shleifer,
Tunneling, 90 AM. ECON. REV. 22 (2000) [hereinafter Johnson et al., Tunneling].
3. Rafael La Porta, Florencio Lopez-de-Silanes, & Andrei Shleifer, Corporate
Ownership Around the World, 54 J. FIN. 471, 511 (1999) [hereinafter La Porta et al.,
Corporate Ownership].
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Both theoretical and empirical studies are devoted to understanding
tunneling and the ways through which controlling shareholders extract
private benefits at a cost to investors. Related party transactions (RPTs)
are evident as one of the major ways through which controlling shareholders
divert corporate resources to themselves. The prevalence of abusive
RPTs could hamper market integrity and lead to a national discount on
the capital market.4 In consideration of the significant impact of abusive
RPTs on corporate governance, the Organisation for Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD) in the 2008 Asian Roundtable on
Corporate Governance listed abusive RPTs as a major challenge in
Asian corporate governance and initiated a task force to develop a
practical guide to monitoring abusive RPTs.5
The “law and finance” literature has demonstrated that law, in particular,
legal protection of investors against tunneling or self-dealing of controlling
shareholders, plays an important role in the development of financial
markets.6 It is possible that laws affect the development of financial
markets through constraint over tunneling.7 Accounting treatment and
disclosure requirement of self-dealing transactions are certainly the
foundation of effective legal control over tunneling.8 In addition to fair
accounting treatment and disclosure, corporate boards should be the
major institution in monitoring RPTs. Therefore, the independent
director, being presumably independent from controlling shareholders, is
an appropriate institution in policing RPTs on behalf of non-controlling
shareholders.9

4. ORG. FOR ECON. CO-OPERATION & DEV., CORPORATE GOVERNANCE SERIES:
GUIDE ON FIGHTING ABUSIVE RELATED PARTY TRANSACTIONS IN ASIA 11–12 (2009),
available at http://www.oecd.org/daf/corporate/principles [hereinafter OECD RPT Guide].
5. ORG. FOR ECON. CO-OPERATION & DEV., THE 2008 ASIAN ROUNDTABLE ON
CORPORATE GOVERNANCE, CONCLUSIONS AND KEY FINDINGS NOTE (2008), available at
http://www.oecd.org/document/39/0,3343,en_2649_34813_40144295_1_1_1_37439,00.html.
6. Simeon Djankov, Rafael La Porta, Florencio Lopez-de-Silanes & Andrei Shleifer,
The Law and Economics of Self-Dealing, 88 J. FIN. ECON. 430 (2008); Rafael La Porta,
Florencio Lopez-de-Silanes & Andrei Shleifer, What Works in Securities Laws?, 61 J.
FIN. 1 (2006); Rafael La Porta, Florencio Lopez-de-Silanes, Andrei Shleifer & Robert W.
Vishny, Law and Finance, 106 J. POL. ECON. 1113 (1998).
7. Vladimir Atanasov, Bernard Black & Conrad S. Ciccotello, Unbundling
and Measuring Tunneling 30–31 (Univ. of Tex. Sch. of Law Law & Econ., Working Paper
No. 117, 2008), available at http://ssrn.com/abstract=1030529 [hereinafter Atanasov et al.,
Unbundling Tunneling].
8. Id. at 31–34.
9. OECD RPT GUIDE, supra note 4, at 8.
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This Article intends to explore the extent to which independent
directors constrain tunneling by controlling shareholders in Taiwan.
Taiwan serves as an appropriate jurisdiction for research since the
private benefits agency problem is prevalent among Taiwanese public
companies. A further twist in Taiwan’s case is that independent directors
were newly introduced to Taiwan’s corporate boards, which follow dualboard system where the traditional monitoring function is served by
statutory supervisors, instead of board committees, which adds to the
complexity in analyzing the effectiveness of independent directors in
constraining tunneling activities.
Part II reviews relevant literature and lays the foundation for this
paper. Part III details the methodology of this research study, mainly indepth interviews. Part IV reviews the current state of corporate governance
in Taiwan. Part V reports empirically the function of independent directors
and their oversight of RPTs among sample Taiwanese public companies.
Part VI analyzes the institutional constraints of independent directors in
overseeing controlling shareholders and reviews the effect of legal
transplantation. Finally, this paper concludes with a summary of findings in
Part VII.
II. INDEPENDENT DIRECTORS AS CORPORATE MONITORS
A. Background
Economists see boards of directors as one of the decision-control
measures that reduce agency costs arising from the separation of ownership
and control in corporations.10 In the United States, where corporate
ownerships are mostly widely held, the principal agency cost problem is
managerial indiscretion arising from the conflicts of interests between
managers and shareholders. The legal system has relied on outside
independent directors to monitor managerial abuses on behalf of dispersed
owners and to render impartial judgments in situations involving conflicts
of interests.11 Following the Enron and Worldcom debacles, the law relied
on independent directors even more in monitoring managerial irregularities.

10. Eugene Fama & Michael Jensen, Separation of Ownership and Control, 26 J.
L. & ECON. 301, 311 (1983) (describing boards of directors as “the common apex of the
decision control systems of organizations, large and small, in which decision agents do
not bear a major share of the wealth effects of their decisions . . .”).
11. Laura Lin, The Effectiveness of Outside Directors as a Corporate Governance
Mechanism: Theories and Evidence, 90 NW. U. L. REV. 898, 904–12 (1996).
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However, most public companies outside the United States and United
Kingdom are not widely held, but are controlled by families or the state.12
While the presence of a controlling shareholder reduces managerial agency
problem, it suffers from private benefits agency problems where controlling
shareholders extract private benefits at a cost to minority shareholders.13
Insofar as the costs of private benefits agency problem are greater than
the benefits of reduction in managerial agency problem, the challenges
of corporate governance in a controlling shareholder system would be to
minimize the extraction of private benefits by controlling shareholders
while preserving managerial discretions for making business decisions.14
Johnson, La Porta, Lopez-de-Silanes, and Shleifer (2000) use the term
“tunneling” to refer to the extraction of private benefits by controlling
shareholders.15 One way to constrain tunneling—or self-dealing—is to
improve the legal system, whether by setting stricter substantive standards
of review, requiring more disclosures, or enhancing enforcement
mechanisms. 16 Mirroring the role of independent directors in widely
held shareholder systems, this paper explores the extent to which
independent directors, as a legal institution, reduce the private benefits
agency costs in controlling shareholder systems.
B. Independent Directors and Private Benefits Agency Problem
1. Controlling-Minority Structure (CMS)
For the past decade, important empirical works have demonstrated
that the ownership structure of non-U.S. public firms is actually quite
different from that of their U.S. counterparts. La Porta, Lopez-deSilanes, and Shleifer (1999) found that, except in economies with very
good shareholder protection, most corporations around the world are
12. La Porta et al., Corporate Ownership, supra note 3, at 511.
13. Ronald J. Gilson & Jeffrey N. Gordon, Controlling Controlling Shareholders,
152 U. PA. L. REV. 785, 785–86 (2003).
14. This is the trade-off between discretion and accountability in corporate governance.
See Alessio M. Pacces, Controlling the Corporate Controller’s Misbehaviour 8–11
(Rotterdam Inst. of Law & Econ., Working Paper Series No. 2009/01, 2008), available
at http://ssrn.com/abstract=1327800.
15. Johnson et al., Tunneling, supra note 2, at 22.
16. Gilson proposes three ways to eliminate inefficient controlling shareholder systems:
improving the legal system, increasing exposure of control to the market, and increasing
access to global capital markets. Ronald J. Gilson, Controlling Shareholders and Corporate
Governance: Complicating the Comparative Taxonomy, 119 HARV. L. REV. 1641, 1653
&1673–78 (2006).
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controlled by families or the state. 17 In addition, the controlling
shareholders typically have power over a given firm in excess of their
cash-flow rights, primarily through the use of dual class shares, pyramids,
cross-shareholding and participation in management. 18 Studies on
regions in East Asia and Western Europe present similar results.19
In East Asia, concentration of ownership in public companies is
especially salient—more than two-thirds of firms are controlled by a
single shareholder, and significant corporate wealth in East Asia is
concentrated among a few families.20 Corporate control in East Asian
countries is typically enhanced by pyramid structures and cross-holding
among firms.21 Bebchuk, Kraakman, and Triantis (2000) apply the term
“controlling-minority structure” (CMS) to the pattern of ownership that,
through structural devices, separates controllers’ “ownership” rights
(cash-flow rights) from controllers’ “control” rights (voting rights). 22
Further, family control and CMS characterize Taiwan’s public firms:
Yeh and Woidtke (2005) found that 72% of Taiwanese public firms had
a controlling shareholder and that, among them, 83% were controlled by
a family.23 In addition, there was considerable divergence between cashflow rights and control rights in over 75% of the firms that have controlling
shareholders, meaning approximately 54% of Taiwanese public companies
are CMS firms.24
17. La Porta et al., Corporate Ownership, supra note 3, at 511.
18. Id.
19. The study shows that almost 37% of Western European firms are widely held
and 44% of the firms are family controlled. Widely held firms are especially important in
U.K. and Ireland, while family control is more important in continental Europe. Mara
Faccio & Larry H.P. Lang, The Ultimate Ownership of Western European Corporations,
65 J. FIN. ECON. 365, 366 (2002).
20. Stijn Claessens, Simeon Djankov & Larry H.P. Lang, The Separation of Ownership
and Control in East Asian Corporations, 58 J. FIN. ECON. 81, 110 (2000).
21. Pyramid structures are defined as owning a majority of the stock of one
corporation which in turn holds a majority of the stock of another, a process that can be
repeated a number of times. Through pyramid structure, controlling shareholders can control
firms through a chain of companies, which can be viewed as another form of separation of
ownership and control. For cross-holding, that means a company further down the chain
of control has some shares in another company in the same business group. See La Porta
et al., Corporate Ownership, supra note 3, at 473; Claessens et al., supra note 20, at 93.
22. Lucian Aye Bebchuk, Reinier Kraakman & George Triantis, Stock Pyramids,
Cross-Ownership and Dual Class Equity: The Mechanisms and Agency Costs of Separating
Control from Cash-Flow Rights, in CONCENTRATED CORPORATE OWNERSHIP 295, 295
(Randall K. Morck, ed., 2000).
23. Yin-Hua Yeh & Tracie Woidtke, Commitment or Entrenchment? Controlling
Shareholders and Board Composition, 29 J. BANKING & FIN. 1857, 1874 (2005). Cf.
Using the same 20% cut-off point, Yeh, Lee, & Woidtke (2001) report that 51.4% while
Claessens et al. (2000) report 48.2% of Taiwan’s public companies are family-controlled.
Yin-Hua Yeh, Tsun-Siou Lee & Tracie Woidtke, Family Control and Corporate Governance:
Evidence from Taiwan, 2 INT’L REV. FIN. 21, 31 (2001); Claessens et al., supra note 20.
24. Yeh & Woidtke, supra note 23, at 1872.
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2. Private Benefits Agency Problem (Tunneling)
Both dispersed-ownership structures and controlled-ownership structures
suffer from less serious agency problems than CMS because CMS lacks
the major mechanisms that limit agency costs in other ownership
structures. 25 In contrast to the dispersed-ownership structure, the
controlling party in a CMS faces no threats from corporate-control contests
because the control-enhancing structural devices per se are highly effective
anti-takeover measures.26 Moreover, in contrast to the controlled-ownership
structure, the controllers in a CMS are entrenched but do not internalize
most of the value effects of their decisions because the controllers’ cashflow rights are relatively low.27
Two major agency problems afflict CMS: (1) divergence-of-interests
agency problems and (2) entrenchment agency problems. 28 The first
type of agency problem arises from a divergence between a controller’s
cash-flow rights and voting rights. This agency problem is similar to the
agency problem between managers and shareholders in firms with
dispersed-ownership structures, as identified by Jensen and Meckling
(1976).29 The second type of agency problem stems from the fact that
the controller in a CMS firm is freer to extract private benefits of control
than are the managers in firms with dispersed-ownership structures
because the controller controls the firm. This phenomenon is called the
entrenchment agency problem. Whereas firms with dispersed-ownership
structures are vulnerable chiefly to divergence-of-interest agency problems
and whereas firms with controlled-ownership structures are vulnerable
chiefly to entrenchment agency problems, CMS firms are vulnerable to
these two types of agency problems simultaneously. The combination of
the two agency problems provides controllers of CMS firms not only the

25. The agency problem associated with dispersed ownership structure is the famous
principal-agency problem that arises from the separation of ownership and control as
indentified by Jensen & Meckling (1976). In addition to the managerial agency problem,
firms with controlling structure also suffer from private benefits agency problem where
controlling shareholders extract private benefits that are not provided to non-controlling
shareholders. Gilson & Gordon, supra note 13, at 785–86.
26. Bebchuk et al., supra note 22, at 301; Randall Morck, Daniel Wolfenzon &
Bernard Yeung, Corporate Governance, Economic Entrenchment, and Growth, 43 J.
ECON. LITERATURE 655, 677 (2005).
27. Bebchuk et al., supra note 22, at 301.
28. Morck et al., supra note 26, at 676–79.
29. Michael C. Jenson & William H. Meckling, Theory of the Firm: Management
Behavior, Agency costs, and Ownership Structure, 3 J. FIN. ECON. 305 (1976).
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incentives, but also the power to extract private benefits at the cost of
minority shareholders—tunneling. Tunneling is a common type of
corporate fraud in CMS-dominated economies, and it is apparent that
Taiwan has this kind of economy.
Bebchuk, Kraakman, and Triantis (2000) further show that, in CMS
contexts, the agency costs that arise can be much greater than those in
the contexts of either dispersed-ownership structures or controlledownership structures because the size of agency costs increases, not
linearly, but at a sharply increasing rate as the size of cash-flow rights
holdings decreases.30 An empirical study by Claessens, Djankov, Fan,
and Lang (2002) and one by Lins (2003) suggest, from their findings,
that firm value declines as the gap between the largest shareholder’s or
management group’s control rights and cash-flow rights grows, a suggestion
that is consistent with tunneling.31 Lemmon and Lins (2003) and Bozec
and Laurin (2007) further support this suggestion by noting that, according
to their respective findings, a CMS firm’s value exhibits relatively steep
declines when the firm experiences either a decline in investment
opportunities or a relatively high free cash flow, either of which provides
incentives for firm insiders to expropriate minority shareholders.32
Alternative corporate governance measures may help to mitigate the
agency costs imbedded in CMS.33 However, alternative measures, such
as a market for corporate control and the presence of outside blockholders,
are generally weak and cannot be implemented in Taiwan as long as one
shareholder or family continues to control public firms. Hence, the
Taiwanese government has sought to strengthen the monitoring function
of corporate boards by introducing independent directors into the
boardroom.
3. Related Party Transaction as a Proxy for Tunneling
To see whether board independence helps tackle tunneling, we need to
first determine the ways through which tunneling occurs. Recent
empirical research studies have identified related party transactions as a
major channel for tunneling. Cheung, Qi, Rau, and Strouraitis (2009)
30. Bebchuk et al., supra note 22, at 301–03.
31. See Stijn Claessens, Simeon Djankov, Joseph P. H. Fan & Larry H. P. Lang,
Disentangling the Incentive and Entrenchment Effects of Large Shareholdings, 57 J. FIN.
2741 (2002); Karl V. Lins, Equity Ownership and Firm Value in Emerging Markets, 38
J. FIN. & QUANTITATIVE ANALYSIS 159, 170–72 (2003).
32. See Michael L. Lemmon & Karl V. Lins, Ownership Structure, Corporate
Governance, and Firm Value: Evidence from the East Asian Financial Crisis, 58 J. FIN.
1445 (2003); Yves Bozec & Claude Laurin, Large Shareholder Entrenchment and
Performance: Empirical Evidence from Canada, 35 J. BUS. FIN. & ACCT. 25 (2008).
33. Bebchuk et al., supra note 22, at 306.
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examine asset transfer transactions between related parties in Hong
Kong and finds that the prices of RPTs are unfavorable when compared
to other similar arm’s length deals. That is, firms pay higher prices
when acquiring assets from related parties and receive lower prices when
selling assets to related parties.34
The minority shareholders of listed firms in China also suffer from
tunneling through loans to the controlling shareholders and their affiliates.
Jiang, Lee, & Yue (2008) examine the financial data of 1,377 public
companies in China from 1996 to 2004 and discover that “tens of billions of
RMB were siphoned from hundreds of Chinese publicly listed companies”
through inter-corporate loans.35 In addition to asset transfers and intercorporate loans, loan guarantees to controlling shareholders and their
affiliates also proved to be one of the major ways expropriation happens
among listed firms in China.36
Beyond academia, policy makers and practitioners from around the
world also recognize RPTs as a major channel for misappropriation of
non-controlling shareholders. The OECD Asian Roundtable on Corporate
Governance has spent several sessions since 2007 discussing the
appropriate regulatory policy towards RPTs37 and formed a special task
force in 2008 to develop a practical guide to monitoring abusive RPTs.38
The guide, published in September 2009, identifies abusive RPTs as
“one of the biggest corporate governance challenges facing the Asian
business landscape.”39

34. Yan-Leung Cheung, Yuehua Qi, P. Raghavendra Rau & Aris Stouraitis, Buy
High, Sell Low: How Listed Firms Price Asset Transfers in Related Party Transactions,
33 J. BANKING & FIN. 914 (2009) [hereinafter Cheung et al., Asset Transfer].
35. Such inter-corporate loans are typically reported as “Other Receivables” in the
financial statements. To get a sense of the severity of this problem, Jiang et al. reports that on
average, “Other Receivables” accounts for 8.1% of the total assets. And around 30% to
40% of “Other Receivables” of the top 30% firms that have the most “Other Receivables” can
be traced back to major shareholders or their affiliates. See Guohua Jiang et al., Tunneling in
China: The Remarkable Case of Inter-Corporate Loans (Stanford Graduate Sch. of Bus.,
Working Paper 2008), available at http://ssrn.com/paper=1154314.
36. Henk Berkman et al., Expropriation Through Loan Guarantees to Related
Parties: Evidence from China, 33 J. BANKING FIN. 141 (2009).
37. See ORG. FOR ECON. CO-OPERATION & DEV., ASIAN ROUNDTABLE ON CORPORATE
G OVERNANCE (2007), available at http://www.oecd.org/document/48/0,3343, en_2649
_34813_39336752_1_1_1_1,00.html.
38. See Org. for Econ. Co-operation & Dev., Asian Roundtable on Corporate
Governance (2008), available at http://www.oecd.org/document/39/0,3343,en_2649_34813
_40144295_1_1_1_37439,00.html.
39. See OECD RPT GUIDE, supra note 4, at 9.
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4. Empirical Evidence
Drawing on prior research that finds related party transaction a major
channel through which controlling shareholders extract private benefits
of control, recent empirical studies examine the extent to which board
independence constrains tunneling by looking into the effect of board
independence on related party transactions.
In a twenty-two-country study, Dahya, Dimitrov, and McConnell
(2008) 40 found that a higher proportion of independent directors is
associated with a lower likelihood of RPTs. Such correlation implies
that independent directors constrain resource diversion by dominant
shareholders. Recent South Korean studies further provide evidence on
the possibility of independent directors to control self-dealing by insiders.
Black, Jang, and Kim (2006) reported that better-governed firms enjoy
higher market value; however, when trying to sort out possible sources
for such correlation, they found that better-governed firms are not more
profitable. Rather, they found stronger evidence that investors value the
same earnings more highly for better-governed firms. This could reflect
that investors believe that better-governed firms will be more profitable
in the future or that better-governed firms will suffer less tunneling—or
both.41
Furthermore, they return to the overall governance index and try to
find the predictive power of each subindex and find strong evidence that
greater board independence predicts higher share prices in South Korea
and the result is likely to be causal. The authors suspect that such result
could be because outside directors may help to control self-dealing by
insiders, which is historically a serious problem in South Korea. Black
and Kim (2008) continued with the Black, Jang, and Kim (2006) study
and used multiple identification strategies to further address the endogeneity
problem faced by the prior study. Black and Kim (2008) found evidence
that share-price increases are associated with boards in which 50% or
more of the directors are outside directors.42 In addition, several years

40. Their major finding is that in firms with dominant shareholders, corporate
value is positively correlated with board independence, especially in countries with weak
legal protection for minority shareholders. Jay Dahya, Orlin Dimitrov & John J.
McConnell, Dominant Shareholders, Corporate Boards and Corporate Value: A CrossCountry Analysis, 87 J. FIN. ECON. 73 (2008).
41. Bernard Black, Hasung Jang & Woochan Kim, Does Corporate Governance
Predict Firms’ Market Values? Evidence from Korea, 22 J.L. ECON. & ORG. 366, 369–70
(2006).
42. Bernard Black & Woochan Kim, The Effect of Board Structure on Firm Value:
A Multiple Identification Strategies Approach Using Korean Data (Univ. of Tex. Sch. of
Law Law & Econ., Working Paper No. 89, 2008), available at http://ssrn.com/abstract
=968287.
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after the reforms, large firms’ profitability rose and the firms’ asset sales
to related parties declined. However, they did not find evidence on other
types of RPTs.
Cheung, Qi, Rau, and Stouraitis (2009) directly examined the effect of
board independence and the presence of audit committee on the transfer
price of related-party asset transfer transactions. They found that the
presence of an audit committee is the only corporate governance
characteristic that affects pricing on both asset acquisition and sale.
Firms with an audit committee pay lower prices to related parties for
asset acquisition and receive higher prices from related parties from asset
disposal.43 From these two studies, we might conclude that a majority
independent board or an audit committee could constrain tunneling
through asset transfer between related parties.
Additional evidence from China supports the notion that more
outsiders on the board help prevent tunneling through operational activities.
Gao and Kling (2008) examined the effect of corporate governance
mechanisms on operational tunneling based on data of listed firms in
China from 1998 to 2002. They determined the extent of tunneling by
the difference between accounts receivables and payables that are based
on RPTs and found that outsiders in the boardroom prevent operational
tunneling.44
Though most of the empirical studies find correlations between board
independence and tunneling, we should be cautious in reading into these
results. Similar to the problems faced by other studies on the impact of
board structure on firm value, these studies suffer from potential
endogeneity problems because board structures are usually voluntarily
chosen and are endogenous to other firm characteristics.45 It may be that
“good” firms, meaning those without tunneling, choose to have more
outside directors on the board, or the results may just be a reflection of
43. However, the percentage of independent non-executive directors on the board
has no impact on the prices paid or received in asset transfer transactions either with
related parties or arm’s length third parties. Cheung et al., Asset Transfer, supra note 34,
at 921–22.
44. Lei Gao & Gerhard Kling, Corporate Governance and Tunneling: Empirical
Evidence from China, 16 PAC. BASIN FIN. J. 591, 600–01 (2008).
45. Benjamin E. Hermalin & Michael S. Weisbach, Board of Directors as an
Endogenously Determined Institution: A Survey of the Economic Literature, 9 ECON.
POL’Y REV. 7, 14–17 (2003); Renee B. Adams, Benjamin E. Hermalin & Michael S.
Weisbach, The Role of Boards of Directors in Corporate Governance: A Conceptual
Framework & Survey 1–2 (Fisher C. Bus., Working Paper No. 2008-03-020, 2009),
available at www.ssrn.com/abstract=1299212.
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self-selection.46 In other words, it may not be a causal relationship but
simply an association. Even though most empirical studies of corporate
governance have tried to address potential endogeneity problems,
commentators argue that such efforts are inadequate because these
studies fail to build theoretical models that clarify the sources and effects
of endogeneity problems and thus overlook the possibility of disparate
treatment effects across firms. 47 Before researchers develop better
identification strategies to address this problem, analytical statisticians
would find it difficult to establish a causal relationship between board
independence and tunneling. To fill in the gap, this paper tackles the
issue based on qualitative methods and interviews independent directors
to understand their practical experience in monitoring RPTs.
III. METHODOLOGY
Independent directors are viewed as an important internal governance
institution in reducing agency costs and monitoring corporate activities.
In Taiwan’s context, the most important agency costs faced by noncontrolling shareholders of public companies come from the possibility
of siphoning out corporate assets by controlling shareholders, so-called
“tunneling.” Tunneling is also the most serious and commonly seen
corporate fraud in Taiwan. Hence, it is worthwhile to test the following
hypothesis in Taiwan’s context:
Independent directors are able to constrain tunneling
by controlling shareholders.
This research study mainly concerns the experience of independent
directors in reviewing related party transactions and intends to interview
independent directors of Taiwanese public companies. The names of
independent directors are available through the Market Observation Post
System (MOPS), a platform maintained by the Taiwan Stock Exchange
that allows public companies to post relevant corporate information
required by the law.48 However, corporate directors in general are difficult
to reach. In addition, the topic of RPTs is business sensitive. Therefore,

46. Roberta Romano, The Sarbanes-Oxley Act and the Making of Quack Corporate
Governance, 114 YALE L.J. 1521, 1532 (2005).
47. Yair Listokin, Interpreting Empirical Estimates of the Effect of
Corporate Governance, 10 AM. L. & ECON. REV. 90, 91–92 (2008).
48. TAIWAN STOCK EXCH., MARKET OBSERVATION POST SYSTEM, http://newmops.
tse.com.tw (last visited Feb. 13, 2011); Venessa Yeh, Information Openness from a
Governance Perspective, PWC TAIWAN, http://www.pwc.com/tw/en/challenges/corporategovernance/indissue0256.jhtml (last visited Feb. 13, 2011).
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the most practical sampling strategy for this research study is convenience
sampling and snowball sampling.49
This research study adopts semi-structured and in-depth interviews,
where the interviewer generally followed a set of predetermined questions
but was allowed to make adjustments depending on the situation.50 The
benefit of conducting semi-structured interviews, instead of structured
interviews, is that semi-structured interviews allow more latitude and
freedom for respondents to talk about what is of interest or importance to
them.51 Such leeway allows further exploration of soft information such
as the personal relationship between interviewees and the controlling
shareholder or management team as well as their personal incentives in
joining the board. Both telephone interviews and face-to-face interviews
are included in this research study. 52 Information about corporate
ownership, subsidiaries, affiliated companies, decisions of board meetings,
corporate governance characteristics, and RPTs of sample firms was
obtained from MOPS.
From September 2008 to December 2009, forty independent directors
of Taiwanese public companies were interviewed for this study. Table 1
lists relevant information about the interviewees. Since the interviews
explore the relationship between interviewees and controlling shareholders
49. Quantitative research studies usually require probability sampling where each
unit in the population must have “an equal and independent chance of inclusion” in the
sample and the parameters required for creating such samples are quite restrictive. However,
social science research studies often examine situations where probability samples are
not feasible; hence, researchers tend to rely instead on nonprobability sampling strategies.
Nonprobability sampling tends to be the norm in social science qualitative research. Some of
the commonly used nonprobability samples are convenience samples, purposive samples,
snowball samples, and quota samples. Snowball sampling is similar to convenience sampling
and is most popular among studies concerning various classes of deviance, sensitive topics, or
difficult-to-reach populations. BRUCE L. BERG, QUALITATIVE RESEARCH METHODS FOR
THE SOCIAL SCIENCES 48–52 (7th ed. 2009).
50. Id. at 107–09.
51. Semi-structured interviews are appropriate when respondents have information
or knowledge that may not have been thought of in advance by the researcher. SHARLENE
NAGY HESSE-BIBER & PATRICIA LEAVY, THE PRACTICE OF QUALITATIVE RESEARCH 125–
26 (2006).
52. 62% of the interviews in this research are conducted through telephone.
Traditionally, telephone interviews are seen as appropriate only for short and structured
interviews. However, by comparing the interview transcripts, a recent empirical study of
interview modes found that there is no significant difference between telephone interviews
and face-to-face interviews. Judith E. Sturges & Kathleen J. Hanrahan, Comparing Telephone
and Face-to-face Qualitative Interviewing: A Research Note, in QUALITATIVE RESEARCH
2 VOLUME 1 COLLECTING DATA FOR QUALITATIVE RESEARCH 31 (Alan Bryman ed.,
2007).
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as well as RPTs in specific companies, which are confidential, all
interviewees are kept anonymous and represented by numbers according
to the sequence of interviews. The date of the interviews and the industries
of the companies they served are also provided.
The average length of interviews is sixty-six minutes. On average, the
interviewees have 4.2 years of experience in serving as independent
directors. Only eleven of them also serve on audit committees. The small
number of interviewees serving on audit committees is due to the fact
that only 3% of the public companies in Taiwan have chosen the board
committee system and established audit committees.53 After deducting
repetitive firms, a total of fifty-seven firms are represented by the
interviewees. In addition, 57.5% of the interviewees serve on a single
board, while 42.5% serve on multiple boards. Among those who serve
on multiple boards, 82% serve on only two boards, and only three
interviewees serve on more than three boards. (Table 1 and 2)
The occupations of the interviewees are quite diverse, including
accountants, CEOs, law firm partners, university professors, venture
capitalists, and former government officials of the Financial Supervisory
Commission. Some of the interviewees are opinion leaders in Taiwan’s
corporate governance reform who not only are familiar with corporate
governance, but also involve deeply in the reform. For example, founders
of the Taiwan Corporate Governance Association, a major nonprofit
that promotes Taiwan’s corporate governance. Thus, the insights of
these people are not limited to their experience with specific companies,
but also expand to their observation of overall corporate governance in
Taiwan.
IV. CORPORATE GOVERNANCE IN TAIWAN
A. An Overview
The corporate environment in Taiwan greatly differs from that in the
United States. In short, corporate ownership is concentrated and familydominated. 54 The largest shareholders of the non-financial firms in
Taiwan control 62.69% of the board seats and 49.55% of the statutory
auditors. Hence, large shareholders in Taiwan not only own public
firms, they also manage and control public firms. The average control
rights of the largest shareholders in non-financial firms is 29.81%,
however, the average cash-flow rights are only 22.13% (Table 3). This
53. As of March 2009, fifty-three out of 1776 public companies established audit
committees. See Taiwan’s Listed Firms Capitalized at NT$5 Billion to Have Auditors,
TAIWAN ECON. NEWS, Dec. 1, 2010, available at Westlaw 2010 WLNR 23871317.
54. Yeh, Lee & Woidtke, supra note 23, at 30–31.
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discrepancy provides an incentive and opportunity for controlling
shareholders to tunnel corporate assets at the expense of minority
shareholders.55
TABLE 2
NUMBER OF INTERVIEWEES ON MULTIPLE BOARDS
No. of Boards
No. of Interviewees
Percentage

1
23
57.5%

2
14
35.0%

I

3
1
2.5%

I

4
1
2.5%

I

5
1
2.5%

I

Before the introduction of independent directors in 2002, many of the
corporate boards in Taiwan functioned like paper meetings. The board
members are either founding family members or top executives. Typically,
family members are involved deeply in the management of the company.
TABLE 3
COMPARISON OF BOARD COMPOSITION AND OWNERSHIP
STRUCTURE BETWEEN FINANCIAL FIRMS AND
NON-FINANCIAL FIRMS IN TAIWAN

Panel A: Board Composition
Percentage of Largest Shareholder
as Directors
Percentage of Largest Shareholder
as Statutory Supervisors
Number of Board Members
Number of Statutory Supervisors
Panel B: Ownership Structure
Control (Voting) Rights of Largest
Shareholders
Cash-Flow Rights of Largest
Shareholders

Non-Financial
Firms

59.18

62.69

57.48

49.55

11.80
3.29

7.13
2.57

24.95

29.81

17.17

22.13

Excess Control (Control Rights – 7.78
Cash-Flow Rights)

7.68

Pyramidal Structure
Cross-Shareholding

0.18
0.33

55.

380

Financial
Firms

See text accompanying notes 25–33.
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Source: YIN-HUA YEH AND CHEN-EN KO, DE RI MEI HAN GEGUO DULI
DONGSHI, SHENJI WEIYUAN HUI JI JITA ZHUANMEN WEIYUAN HUI
FAZHI GUIFAN JI SHIWU YUNZUO QINGKUANG [THE LAW AND PRACTICE
OF I NDEPENDENT D IRECTORS , A UDIT C OMMITTEES AND O THER
F UNCTIONAL COMMITTEES IN GERMANY, JAPAN, UNITED STATES, AND
KOREA], FIN. SUPERVISORY COMM’N OF TAIWAN Table 10-2 at 294–95
(January 2006).

In theory, controlling shareholders, with major shareholdings, monitor
the management more effectively and reduce agency costs greatly as
long as their interests are in line with outside investors. Under this
scenario, the interests of minority shareholders would not be sacrificed
when the controlling shareholders dominate the board. However, if the
control rights of the controlling shareholders exceed their cash-flow
rights, as in the case of Taiwan and most other countries, the interests of
controlling shareholders deviate from those of minority shareholders,
creating the danger that minority shareholders could be expropriated.
This is exactly the danger in Taiwan’s corporate governance.56
Another characteristic of Taiwan’s corporate ownership structure⎯
business groups⎯further provides channels for expropriation.57 Business
groups control and contribute most to the economy of Taiwan: the top
100 business groups in Taiwan own more than 6,300 affiliated firms and
hired more than 3 million employees in 2007, and the total revenue of
the top 100 business groups is 7.8 times that of Taiwan’s government in
2007.58 Their revenue growth in 2007 of 16.01% also far exceeds that of
the gross national product (GNP) of Taiwan. 59 Among the top ten

56. See Yin-Hua Yeh & Chen-En Ko, De Ri Mei Han Geguo Duli Dongshi, Shenji
Weiyuan Hui ji Jita Zhuanmen Weiyuan Hui Fazhi Guifan ji Shiwu Yunzuo Qingkuang
[The Law and Practice of Independent Directors, Audit Committees and Other Functional
Committees in Germany, Japan, U.S., and Korea], FIN. SUPERVISORY COMM’N TAIWAN 294–
95 (2006); Stijn Claessens, Simeon Djankov, Joseph Fan & Larry Lang, Expropriation of
Minority Shareholders in East Asia, WORLD BANK 2, 13 (Feb. 23, 1999), available at http://
www1.worldbank.org/finance/assets/images/expropriation.pdf.
57. TAIWAN SECURITIES & FUTURES INST., CORPORATE GOVERNANCE IN TAIWAN 5–
6 (Oct. 2007).
58. Chailease Finance Co., Ltd., Taiwan Dichu Dashing Chituan Chiye Yanjiu
[Research on Large Business Groups in Taiwan], NEWS CENTER, Oct. 16, 2008, available at
http://www.chailease.com.tw/ugC_NewsCenter_Detail1.asp?hidID=65&hidPage1=1&hidS
howType=his.
59. Zhao Fen Kao, Diaocha: Guonei Baida Chiye 2007 Nian Yingshou Chengzhang
16.01% [Survey: The Top 100 Business Groups Feature Revenue Growth of 16.01% in
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business groups, nine are in the financial industry. Family business
continues to dominate Taiwan’s economy. In terms of total asset value,
family business groups account for 73.56% of the top 100 business
groups. Seven major families in Taiwan control almost 40% of the total
assets of the top 100 groups.60
Given the importance of business groups to Taiwan’s economy, the
corporate governance of business groups becomes vital. One of the key
issues therein is the fairness of the transactions among group firms.
While sometimes these transactions facilitate the growth of business
groups, they also provide channels for controlling shareholders to tunnel
out corporate assets. Several business practices in Taiwan further provide
controlling shareholders easy access to corporate assets without much
oversight in place. For example, cross-shareholding between public parent
companies and subsidiaries keeps public companies in stable
management.61 Controlling shareholders can further control the board by
electing subsidiaries as institutional directors or statutory supervisors,
providing that the subsidiary assigns an individual representative
to perform its duty. Individual representatives of such subsidiaries can
also be elected as directors or statutory supervisors. Furthermore, more
than one such individual representative can be elected director or statutory
supervisor.62 Hence, through cross-shareholding, controlling shareholders
can literally appoint any people he or she wants to serve as directors and
statutory supervisors and embezzle corporate resources without any
internal oversight.

2007], CENT. NEWS AGENCY, Oct. 16, 2008, available at http://www.cna.com.tw/Search
News/doDetail.aspx?id=200810160059.
60. The major families include the Tsai family of Cathay and Fubon Groups, the
Wu family of Shin Kong and Tai Shin Groups, the Wang family of Formosa Plastics Group,
the Gu family of China Trust, Chailease, and Taiwan Cement Group, the Kuo family of
Foxconn Group, the Hsu family of Far Eastern Group, and the Hsu family of Chi Mei
Group. Id.
61. Cross shareholding may help corporation to (1) maintain stable control of
management, (2) facilitate human capital investment, (3) enhance the operational efficiency of
strategic alliance with other firms (4) diversify risks, and (5) facilitate financial arrangements
among group firms. Ming-Jye Huang, Jiao Cha Chi Gu v. Gong Si Jian Kong [Cross
Shareholding v. Corporate Governance], in GONG KAI FA SHIN GONG SH FA ZHI YU
GONG SI JIAN KONG [PUBLIC COMPANY REGULATION AND CORPORATE GOVERNANCE]
185, 194–203 (2001).
62. GONG SI FA [Company Act] art. 27 (2009) (Taiwan), available at http://law.
moj.gov.tw/eng/LawClass/LawAll.aspx?PCode=J0080001.
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B. Related Party Transactions in Taiwanese Firms
1. A Survey of Literature
Prior literature and corporate scandals in Taiwan indicate that
tunneling is a significant threat to corporate governance in Taiwan and
the major channel of tunneling is through RPTs. However, the overall
efficiency of RPTs is unclear.63 The RPTs could be seen as a result of
vertical integration and thus have positive effect on the growth of
business group. On the other hand, the terms of RPTs could be
manipulated by the controlling shareholders in order to serve their self
interests in benefiting the parties in which controlling shareholders own
higher equity stakes. In this case, RPTs reduce efficiency, and the firm
could be better off by transacting with unrelated parties under fair terms.
Tunneling is by nature not easily observable by mere public
information.64 It usually takes years and countless public resources to
investigate and uncover the tip of the iceberg. Thus, systematic measuring
of the extent of tunneling activities is a hard subject for researchers.
Most empirical studies use indirect measures, such as the level of
investor protection in the legal system and the wedge between cash-flow
rights and control rights of the controlling shareholders, as a proxy for
tunneling and examine the relation between such proxies and firm value.65
Some provide more direct evidence on tunneling, but all are based on
data from emerging markets. For example, Bertrand, Mehta and
Mullainathan (2002) report evidence on tunneling in an Indian business
group which is characterized with pyramidal ownership structures by
measuring the responsiveness of firm profitability to shocks in industry
profitability. In theory, a low-cash-flow-right firm will be less responsive to
industry shocks than a high-cash-flow-right firm assuming that controlling
shareholders tunnel resources from a low-cash-flow-right firm to a highcash-flow-right firm. Further, Bae et al. (2002) examine the stock market
responses to merger announcements in Korea chaebols and find that the
63. Bernard S. Black, Woochan Kim, Hasung Jang & Kyung-Suh Park, How Corporate
Governance Affects Firm Value: Evidence on Channels from Korea 17–18 (Univ. of
Tex. Sch. of Law, Working Paper No. 51, 2008), available at http://ssrn.com/abstract
=844744.
64. Atanasov et al., Unbundling Tunneling, supra note 7, at 1–2.
65. See generally Rafael La Porta, Florencio Lopez-de-Silanes, and Andrei Shleifer,
Investor Protection and Corporate Valuation, 57 J. FIN. 1147 (2002); Claessens et al.,
supra note 31; Lins, supra note 31.
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stock prices of chaebol-affiliated firms on average fall when announcing
acquisition of group firms, suggesting that controlling shareholders
expropriate wealth from minority shareholders through intra-group
acquisitions.66 In addition, Cheung et al. (2006) examines the stock market
responses for the announcement of RPTs using data from Hong Kong
and find that, on average, firms announcing RPTs with major shareholders
or directors experience excess negative returns than those announcing
similar arm’s length transactions.67 Berkman et al. (2009) provide further
evidence on tunneling through loan guarantees to the controlling blockholders
in Chinese firms by testing whether the issuance is negatively related to
firm value and firm performance.
While these studies manifest specific channels of tunneling, they do
not provide evidence on exactly how controlling shareholders extract
private benefits through these transactions. La Porta et al. (2003), using
data set from Mexico where banks can be controlled by nonfinancial
firms, examine the terms of bank loans with related parties and find that
related lending accounts for 20% of commercial loans and enjoy lower
interests rates than arm’s-length loans. Related loans are 33% more
likely to default and have a much lower recovery rate.68 Cheung et al.
(2009) further provide evidence on how controlling shareholders tunnel
through asset transfer transactions. Using data containing specific asset
transfer transactions disclosed by Hong Kong companies, they find that
firms acquiring assets from related parties pay a higher price compared
to similar arms’ length transactions and firms selling assets to related
parties receive a lower price compared to similar arms’ length transactions.69
The result confirms the hypothesis that controlling shareholders in Hong
Kong tunnel through related party asset transfer transactions. Atanasov,
Black and Ceccotello (2008) continue the effort in unbundling tunneling
by dissecting tunneling into three types: cash flow, asset and equity.
They develop economic models that explore how different types of
tunneling affect share prices and financial results.70 The study suggests
that the law might affect finance through regulating tunneling activities.
Although the efficiency and wealth transfer effect of RPTs cannot be
determined unless the actual terms of specific transactions are available,

66. See Kee-Hong Bae, Bae, Jun-Koo Kang & Jin-Mo Kim, Tunneling or Value
Added? Evidence From Merger by Korean Business Groups, 57 J. FIN. 2695 (2002).
67. See Yan-Leung Cheung. P. Raghavendra Rau & Aris Stouraitis, Tunneling,
Propping, and Expropriation: Evidence From Connected Party Transactions in Hong
Kong, 82 J. FIN. ECON. 343 (2006). [hereinafter Cheung et al., Hong Kong].
68. Rafael La Porta, Florencio López-De-Silanes & Guillermo Zamarripa, Related
Lending, 118 Q. J. ECON. 231 (2003).
69. Cheung et al., Asset Transfer, supra note 34.
70. Atanasov et al., Unbundling Tunneling, supra note 7, at 11–21.
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growing literature shows that transactions among related parties are
generally detrimental to the value of minority shareholders. The
empirical research results warrant more serious policy discussions on the
disclosure and approval policy of RPTs. However, the law in Taiwan
does not require public companies to disclose the transaction value of
each RPT, rather it only require firms to disclose counterparty, the types
of transactions, and the cumulative amount during the accounting year.71
Hence, insufficient information exists to test whether these RPTs are
tunneling or propping. To date, there is a lack of systematic studies on
the effect of RPTs by Taiwanese public companies. While assessing the
effect of RPTs on shareholder value is beyond the scope of this research,
a preliminary effort in presenting the current state of RPTs engaged by
Taiwanese public companies and the state of board oversight over RPTs
would shed light on the issue discussed in this paper.
2. Related Party Transactions in Sample Firms
There are a total of forty-one sample listed firms excluding financial
firms. Among the forty-one sample firms, thirty-none have disclosed RPTs
in their 2007 financial statements. I exclude transactions with whollyowned subsidiaries since those transactions do not bear tunneling concerns.
I categorize these transactions by counterparty and transaction type.
i. Counterparty
Counterparties can be categorized into four major types—(1)
controlling firms, (2) chairmen, (3) directors,72 and (4) affiliated firms—
and eleven sub-categories—(1) controlling firms, (2) firms affiliated
with controlling firms, (3) chairman, (4) firms controlled by the chairman,
(5)relatives of the chairman, (6) firms controlled by the relatives of the
chairman, (7) individual directors, (8) firms affiliated with individual
directors, (9) company directors, (10) firms affiliated with company
directors, and finally, and (11) affiliated firms of the subject firm. A

71. Statement of Fin. Accounting Standards No.6, § 4(c) (Fin. Accounting Standards
Comm. Taiwan 1985), available at http://www.ardf.org.tw/english/Full%20Text%20ac2008/06.pdf.
72. Taiwan’s Company Law allows a legal entity or government to be elected as a
director, the so-called “company director.” If a legal entity or government is elected as a
director, it is free to assign an individual representative to perform its duty. See GONG SI
FA, supra note 62.
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firm can only be counted once in each category as long as the firm enters
into a transaction with the subject type of party, no matter how many
transactions it conducts. On the other hand, a firm can be counted once
in each and every category as long as it enters into transactions with
each type of party. Table 4 shows the result.
Approximately half of the firms transact with the firms in which they
invested—the affiliated firms. This reflects the popularity of vertical
integration and business grouping in Taiwan’s economy. The effect of
this category of transactions could be twofold. First, the sample firm
might benefit from such transactions if the sample firm has considerable
influence over the affiliated firm, and thus receives beneficial terms over
the transaction.73 Second, the minority shareholders of the sample firm
might as well be expropriated from such transaction if the controlling
shareholder also holds, either directly or indirectly, personal shares in
the affiliated firms, and could personally benefit from the transaction by
forcing the sample firm to enter into inferior terms with the affiliated
firm. This situation is most likely to happen if the controlling shareholder’s
equity stake is higher in the affiliated firms.
Other transactions are with controlling firms, chairmen, directors, and
their affiliated firms. Controlling firms, chairmen, and directors are
typically influential on board decisions and deserve great scrutiny when
they transact with the firm. In addition, RPTs with these three
constituencies involve conflicts of interest and could potentially serve as
a vehicle for tunneling. In theory, this is when independent directors
step in and ensure the fairness of the transactions on behalf of minority
shareholders.
ii. Transaction Type
The types of transactions into which the firms enter might also provide
clues about tunneling. Commentators have regarded some transactions a
priori likely to result in expropriation of minority shareholders—asset
acquisitions, asset sales, equity sales, trading relationship (purchases or
sales of goods and services), and cash payments with a connected person
or a private company majority-controlled by this person.74 Recent

73. Cheung et al. (2006) and (2009) categorizes transactions between listed firms and
its non-listed subsidiaries as potentially propping transactions. Cheung et al., Hong Kong,
supra note 67, at 356; Yan-Leung Cheung, Lihua Jing, Tong Lu, Raghavendra Rau &
Aris Stouraitis, Tunneling and Propping Up: An Analysis of Related Party Transactions
by Chinese Listed Companies, 17 PAC. BASIN FIN. J. 372, 381 (2009) [hereinafter Cheung
et al., China].
74. Under Hong Kong law, a connected person includes the listed firm’s (or the
subsidiary’s) substantial shareholders, the chief executive, the directors, and their associates,
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empirical studies have also looked into specific types of RPTs and found
that controlling shareholders in Hong Kong and China have embezzled
corporate assets through asset acquisitions, asset sales, inter-corporate
loans, and loan guarantees.75 However, not every aforementioned type
of RPTs results in tunneling.
Friedman, Johnson, and Mitton (2003) acknowledges that while it is
widely recognized that controlling shareholders tunnel assets out of the
firms, sometimes they also prop up the firms using their private funds.76
However, due to the clandestine nature of RPTs and the difficulty in
discerning the market value of the subject assets, empirical research
studies usually cannot explicitly distinguish propping activities from
tunneling.77
Using multiple classification methods, Cheung, Rau, and Stouraitis
(2006) pioneered efforts to categorize RPTs as tunneling or propping by
examining the market-adjusted cumulative average abnormal returns
(CARs) around the announcement day.78 In general, the valuation effects
are consistent with their classification using a priori knowledge, where
asset transfers (including asset acquisitions, asset sales, and asset swaps),
trading relationships, and cash payments with connected persons, which are
categorized as tunneling, are value-destroying, and cash receipts and
subsidiary relationships as propping are value-enhancing. However, only
the value changes in asset acquisitions, asset swaps, trading relationships,
cash payments, and cash receipts are statistically significant. The valuation
effects of asset sales and subsidiary relationships are uncertain.79 Using the
same technique, Cheung, Jing, Lu, Rau, and Stouraitis (2009) examined the
valuation effect of 290 sample RPTs of Chinese listed companies during
including any company in which the above hold a substantial shareholding. Cheung et al.,
Hong Kong, supra note 67, at 349, 355–56.
75. Berkman et al., supra note 36; Cheung et al., Asset Transfer, supra note 34;
Jiang et al., supra note 35.
76. Friedman et al. (2003) develop a theoretical model to rationalize such propping
behavior and conclude that controlling shareholders are likely to prop up the firms when firms
experience moderate negative shock (hoping to tunnel more in the future if the firms can
stay in business) and usually propped up firms are more highly leveraged. Eric Friedman,
Simon Johnson & Todd Mitton, Propping and tunneling, 31 J. COMP. ECON. 732 (2003).
77. Both Berkman et al. (2009) and Jiang et al. (2008) use the existence of relatedparty loan guarantees and inter-corporate loans as proxies for tunneling. Cheung et al.,
Asset Transfer try to directly assess the value of the assets by simulating the “fair value”
of the traded assets. Berkman et al., supra note 36, at 141–42; Cheung et al., Asset
Transfer, supra note 34, at 916–17; Jiang et al., supra note 35, at 13–15.
78. Cheung et al., Hong Kong, supra note 67.
79. Id. at 366–71.
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2001 and 2002. Similar to the results of Cheung, Rau, and Stouraitis
(2006), the Chinese study finds that asset acquisitions, asset swaps, trading
relationships, and cash payments are value-destroying and cash receipts
are value-enhancing.80
TABLE 4
RELATED PARTY TRANSACTIONS—BY COUNTERPARTY
CONTROLLING FIRMS
Controlling Firms
Firms Affiliated with the
Controlling Firms
CHAIRMEN
Chairman
Firms Controlled by the Chairman
Relatives of the Chairman
Firms Controlled by the Relatives
of the Chairman
DIRECTORS
Individual Directors
Firms Affiliated with
Individual Directors
Company Directors
Firms Affiliated with Company
Directors
AFFILIATED FIRMS*
Affiliated Firms of the Subject Firm

NO. OF
FIRMS
13
13

6
11
2
2

4
1
6
5

22

* Affiliated Firms refer to those firms in which the subject firm invested
but excludes wholly-owned subsidiaries.

80.
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TABLE 5
RELATED PARTY TRANSACTIONS–BY TRANSACTION TYPE
TRANSACTION TYPE
Asset Acquisitions
Asset Sales
Equity Acquisitions
Equity Sales
Sale of Goods and Services
Purchase of Goods and Services
Loans and Guarantees
Rent Expenses
Cash Receipts
Others

NO. OF FIRMS
5
5
2
3
29
24
8
11
7
14

The use of CARs as a measurement, which only reflects new
information to the market, did not take into account the situation in which
the investors could have anticipated the expropriation and acquired their
shares at a discounted price. 81 However, Cheung, Rau, and Stouraitis
(2006) finds limited evidence that supports the anticipation argument,
suggesting that investors cannot anticipate expropriation prior to the
announcement of RPTs and the value change is likely due to the
announcement of RPTs.82
Table 5 provides a classification of the RPTs of the sample firms by
transaction types. Twenty-nine firms (70%) engage in sales of goods
and services transactions with related parties, twenty-four (59%) engage
in purchases transactions, eleven (27%) firms rent offices or warehouses
from related parties, eight (20%) provide loans and guarantees (similar
to cash payments in Cheung, Rau, and Stouraitis (2006)), five (12%)
engage in asset transfer transactions, and twenty-two (54%) engage in
transactions with subsidiaries.
To assess whether the sample RPTs involve conflicts of interest, we
also need to know the party of the transaction. I further classify sample
RPTs by both counterparty and transaction type in Table 6 and 7. The
most common RPTs with controlling firms are trading relationships, rent
81. RONALD GILSON & BERNARD BLACK, THE LAW AND FINANCE
ACQUISITIONS 216–17 (2d ed. 1995).
82. Cheung et al., Hong Kong, supra note 67, at 375–79.
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and asset acquisitions. Twenty-three firms (56%) sell goods to and thirteen
firms (32%) purchase goods from controlling firms, nine firms (22%)
rent offices or warehouses from controlling firms, and seven firms (17%)
acquire assets from controlling firms. Since controlling firms have
control power over sample firms, it is likely that the above transactions
involve tunneling. Cheung, Rau, and Stouraitis (2006) and Cheung, Jing,
Lu, Rau, and Stouraitis (2009) also found confirming evidence.
Trading and renting relationships are also common among the RPTs
with chairpersons. However, there are loans and guarantees as well as
cash-receipt relationships with chairpersons. This suggests that a
chairperson and his or her controlled firms not only benefits from financing
by the sample firms, but he or she also helps finance the sample firms by
providing loans or guarantees if needed. The financing chairperson and
the firms that the chairperson controls occur in two sample firms which
are relatively small in size and controlled by individuals. In one of these
firms, the chairperson also provides personal loans to the company with
no interests. Hence, there are also propping transactions among sample
firms.
The chairmen of four samples firms serve as guarantors for bank loans
of the sample firms. Interestingly, three of these firms belong to the same
business group controlled by a well-know family in Taiwan. Therefore,
such practice could be seen as a group specific practice. One group sample
firm borrows money from a bank which is controlled by the family of the
spouse of the chairman. Overall, financing relationships between chairman
and listed firms are not common and seems to be firm or business group
specific.
Again, trading relationships are also common among the RPTs with
company directors. This also reflects investments among firms that have
business relationships. RPTs with subsidiaries or affiliates are mostly
trading relationships. While seven firms provide loans and guarantees to
their affiliates, no sample firms receive cash or guarantees from affiliates.
Six firms sell assets or equity to their subsidiaries or affiliated firms,
which mirrors the results in asset acquisitions where seven firms purchase
assets from controlling firms. Hence, in related-party asset transfer
transactions, there is a tendency that firms lower in the ownership chain
tend to purchase assets from firms that are upstream. It is likely that the
upstream firm (sometimes the controlling shareholder) will exert its
influence over the terms and force the downstream firm (the subsidiaries
or affiliates) to pay higher prices for the assets. Hence, from the evidence
presented to us, we can reasonably infer that the asset or equity sales
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transactions with affiliated firms are most likely propping transactions
for sample firms.83
Overall, there are considerable asset acquisitions, trading transactions,
as well as cash payment transactions between sample firms and their
controlling shareholders, chairmen, and directors. Cheung, Rau, and
Stouraitis (2006) and Cheung, Jing, Lu, Rau, and Stouraitis (2009) report
that those transactions result in significant negative abnormal returns for
listed firms in Hong Kong and China, suggesting that controlling
shareholders might tunnel through those transactions. Although there is
no systematic study of RPTs in Taiwan testing the valuation effects of
each type of transactions, we can still reasonably infer from logical
reasoning and limited evidence from Hong Kong and China that sample
Taiwanese firms may engage in tunneling activities through RPTs with
controlling firms, chairmen and directors. Even if those transactions do
not in fact involve tunneling, the conflicts of interest between related
parties and sample listed firms also warrant the participation of independent
directors in the decision-making process.

83.

Cheung et al., Asset Transfer, supra note 34.
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TABLE 6
RELATED PARTY TRANSACTIONS–CROSS TABLE 1
Controlling
Firm

Chairman

Asset
Acquisitions

7

Asset Sales

1

Affiliated
Firms (not
whollyowned
subsidiary)
of Subject
Firm

Total

1

2

10

3

4

8

Equity
Acquisitions

Directors

3

Equity Sales

1

3
2

3

Sale of Goods
and Services

23

10

8

12

53

Purchase of
Goods and
Services

13

9

7

9

38

Loans and
Guarantees

1

3

-

7

11

Rent
Expenses

9

5

1

15

Cash Receipts

2

6

2

13

Other

10

5

2

6

Total

67

43

23

42

392

23

Asset
Aquisitions

Asset
Sa les

Equity
Acquisi tions

Sale of
Goods
and
Services

Purchase
of
Gocxis
and
Services

Loans and
Guarantee s

Rent
EJqx,nses

Cash
Receipts

Other

Total

11

4

l

8

2

6

35

12

9

l

l

I

4

32

l

5

8

7

2

2

1
3

27
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Controlling
Firms
4

3

1

l

3

I

Chairman

2
2

2

8

2

I

1

6
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Chairman
Firms
Controlled by
the Chairman
Relatives of
the Chairman
Firms
Controlled by
the Relatives
of the
Cha irn1an
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Controlling,
Firm
Firms
Affi liated with
Controlling,
Firm

I

3
1

1

4

1

3

5

5

l

2

1

2

8
8

2

4

2

12

9

7

10

8

3

53

38

11

6

15

13

42

42
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The number in the column represents the number of sample firms that
have disclosed the type of RPTs with correspondent counterparty in 2007.
If a sample firm engages in asset acquisition and sale of goods
with controlling shareholder, this will count as one in the Asset
Acquisition/Controlling Firm column and one in the Sales of Goods and
Services/Controlling Firm column.
C. Corporate Board Reform
The corporate-board structure around the world has two major styles:
(1) the Anglo-American style, and (2) the German style, also known as
the “one-tier system” and the “two-tier system,” respectively. In general,
the Anglo-American style board structure, notably that of the United
States and the United Kingdom, relies on the board of directors and
several sub-committees to monitor the management. The German style
structure relies on a supervisory board to monitor the management board
while the management board focuses on managing the company. The
structure of a given board is clearly path dependent in relation to the given
country’s political and economic conditions. Many Asian countries follow
the German style governance structure because they first transplanted
their corporate law from European legal systems.
The corporate-board structure of Taiwan generally follows the Japanese
style governance structure, which is a modified version of the German
governance structure. The governance structure in Taiwan and in Japan
differs from the typical German governance structure in that the statutorysupervisor positions in Japan and Taiwan are weaker than its German
counterpart, the supervisory board. In Germany, the supervisory board
has the right to appoint or remove directors; however, in Japan and
Taiwan, supervisors are nominated by the board and elected by the
shareholders.84 In addition, the statutory supervisors in Taiwan do not
act collectively as a board like their German or Japanese counterpart, but
rather act individually.85 According to the Corporation Law of Taiwan,
a supervisor is an independent supervisory institution responsible for
auditing the business conditions of companies and for evaluating the

84. Ronald J. Gilson & Curtis J. Milhaupt, Choice as Regulatory Reform: The Case of
Japanese Corporate Governance, 53 AM. J. COMP. L. 343, 348 (2005).
85. Japan reformed its statutory auditor system in 1993 to introduce a board of
statutory auditors and require at least one member of the auditor board to be an outside
auditor. Before that, statutory auditors in Japan act individually. Id. at 347–48.
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performance of companies’ boards of directors and managers.86 However,
in Taiwan, a supervisor has the right only to attend board meetings, not
the right to vote. In addition, the pre-reform law set no qualification for
supervisors. In practice, many supervisors are relatives or friends of the
founding family, the controlling shareholder, directors, or top managers.
Therefore, most statutory supervisors of Taiwanese public companies
are just “rubber stamps.”
In the aftermath of Enron and other high-profile corporate-fraud cases,
the U.S. Congress, enacted the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002 (SOX)
which placed great reliance on outside, independent directors and audit
committees as a means of monitoring both firms’ internal control system
and the integrity of firms’ financial-reporting systems. Following the
passage of SOX, many Asian countries, such as China, Japan, South Korea,
and Taiwan, initiated corporate-board reforms to be in alignment with
the U.S. style governance structure. In response to local corporate-fraud
scandals, Taiwan’s financial authority has considered introducing the
institution of independent directors to enhance corporate-monitoring
functions. Finally, in 2006, Congress revised the Securities and Exchange
Act to give public companies the option to choose whether or not they
have independent directors.87 In addition, public companies also have
the option to choose whether or not they establish audit committees, and
if they do, the law requires that the companies abandon the institution of
statutory supervisor. 88 The amendment basically resembles the 2002
Japanese board reform, which also grants corporations the option to
choose between the U.S. style board structure and traditional board
structure.89
What distinguishes Taiwan’s reform from Japan’s reform is that the
financial authority of Taiwan may deprive the choice of Taiwan’s public
corporation, whereas that of Japan may not. In March 2006, Taiwan’s
Financial Supervisory Commission (FSC) mandated that all public
financial firms and those non-financial listed firms with equity value
over NT$50 billion (US$1.6 billion) should have at least two independent
directors on their board, and that the total number of independent directors
should be no less than one-fifth the number of board members.90 On
March 22, 2011, the FSC further expanded the mandate to firms with
86. GONG SI FA [Company Act] art. 218 (2009) (Taiwan) available at http://law.
moj.gov.tw/eng/LawClass/LawAll.aspx?PCode=J0080001.
87. ZHENG QUAN JIAO YI FA [Securities and Exchange Act] art. 14-2 (2010) (Taiwan),
available at http://law.moj.gov.tw/eng/LawClass/LawAll.aspx?PCode=G0400001.
88. ZHENG QUAN JIAO YI FA art. 14-4.
89. Gilson & Milhaupt, supra note 84, at 352–54.
90. Financial Supervisory Commission, Jing-Kuan-Cheng-1-Tzu-0950001616-Hao,
Mar. 28, 2006 (abolished on Mar. 22, 2011).
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equity value over NT$10 billion (US$345 million).91 As of March 2011,
41.79% of the Taiwan Stock Exchange (TSE) listed companies have at
least one independent director on their board.92
Under current regulation, there are three types of board structures in
Taiwanese public companies: (1) with independent directors and an audit
committee (no statutory supervisor), (2) with independent directors and
statutory supervisors (no audit committee), (3) with only statutory
supervisors. In general, large companies—with equity value over NT$50
billion (US$1.6 billion)—and newly listed companies—which are
generally much smaller in size—should have at least two independent
directors on the board. Other companies have the option to choose among
the three types.
D. Board Reform in Japan and China
Japan and China also undertook similar corporate board reform. Japan
adopted an enabling approach, which allows companies to choose between
the U.S. board-governance system and the Japanese board-governance
system. 93 In analyzing some characteristics attributable to Japanese
firms that, as of March 2004, adopted the U.S. governance structure, Gilson
and Milhaupt (2005) initially tested the effectiveness of the enabling
approach and the attractiveness of U.S. style corporate-governance structure
abroad. They found no clear strategy of adoption and no significant market
reaction to the choice of adopting the unitary board structure. This
finding may reflect the lack of reform-related consensus, which itself
reflects some of the impetus behind the enabling approach. Gilson and
Milhaupt’s initial examination of the Japanese board reform suggests
that formal convergence may trigger an initial reduction in overall system
productivity because the new form was perhaps not complementary with
91 . Financial Supervisory Commission, Jing-Kuan-Cheng-Fa-Tzu-1000010723-Hao,
Mar. 22, 2011.
92. As of March 2011, 318 TSE-listed companies have at least one independent director.
There are a total of 761 TSE-listed companies as of February 2011. TAIWAN STOCK EXCH.,
Statistics: Summary Data of Stock Market (by Year) http://www.twse.com.tw/ch/statistics/
statistics_list.php?tm=04&stm=004; Market Observation Post System, TAIWAN STOCK EXCH.,
available at http://mops.twse.com.tw/mops/web/t93sb05 (last visited May 5, 2011).
93. It should be noted that, under Japanese corporate law, an “outside director” can
be affiliated with a controlling shareholder or parent company as long as he/she is or was
not the management, employee or director of the firm or its subsidiaries. That means an
outside director in Japan can be affiliated and not independent. Gilson & Milhaupt, supra
note 84, at 358.
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other existing institutions.94 This study reminds us of the importance of
local forces in the success of corporate-governance reform.95
Clarke (2006) is generally pessimistic about the effectiveness of
independent directors’ ability to police Chinese public companies.96 In
2001, the China Securities Regulatory Commission issued its Guidance
Opinion on the Establishment of an Independent Director System in
Listed Companies requiring that all listed companies have at least two
independent directors and that such directors constitute at least one-third
of the board. Clarke (2006) argues that proponents of the independentdirector position misconceive the nature of the corporate-governance
problem in China, as well as the function of independent directors in the
United States, and have not taken into account specific features of the
Chinese institutional environment. Therefore, he urges, China should
develop a system of corporate governance that possesses Chinese
characteristics. The experiences of Japan and China remind us of the
importance of local institutions’ path dependence.97
V. DO INDEPENDENT DIRECTORS PREVENT TUNNELING?
A. Who are Independent Directors?
From where exactly do these independent directors come? This study
classifies the occupation into ten categories and compiles data from
MOPS where descriptions of each independent director’s current fulltime job are available. The top three occupations for independent
directors are: (1) corporate directors (29.03%), (2) professors (24.91%),
and (3) managers (12.36%) (Table 8). In the United States, most
independent directors are directors or CEOs of other public companies.98
In Taiwan, corporate directors and CEOs account for 41.2% of all
independent directors, which is still a significant number. Together with
managers, people from the corporate world make up over half (53.56%)
of this population.
94. Ronald J. Gilson, Globalizing Corporate Governance: Convergence of Form
or Function, 49 AM. J. COMP. L. 329, 339 (2001).
95. An insightful remark by the authors is “The transmission of ideas from one
system to another is highly complex, and thus despite outward appearances of convergence of
purpose in corporate governance reform around the world, the trajectory and end point of
reform in any given system will be shaped by intensely local forces.” Gilson & Milhaupt,
supra note 84, at 372.
96. Donald C. Clarke, The Independent Director in Chinese Corporate Governance,
31 DEL. J. CORP. L. 125 (2006).
97. See Ronald J. Gilson, Corporate Governance and Economic Efficiency: When
Do Institutions Matter?, 74 WASH. U. L.Q. 327, 332 (1996); id. at 208–16.
98. Ronald J. Gilson & Reinier Kraakman, Reinventing the Outside Director: An
Agenda for Institutional Investors, 43 STAN. L. REV. 863, 875 (1991).
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TABLE 8
OCCUPATIONS OF INDEPENDENT DIRECTORS
OCCUPATIONS
Corporate Directors
Professors
Managers
CEO
Accountants
Others
Lawyers
Government Officials
Politicians
Physicians
Total

NUMBER
155
133
66
65
39
30
24
10
10
2
534

PERCENTAGE
29.03
24.91
12.36
12.17
7.30
5.62
4.49
1.87
1.87
0.37

Analyzed and catagorized by the author. Source: Market Observation
Post System, Taiwan Stock Exchange (October 2008).

One remarkable observation about the population of independent
directors in Taiwan is that “professors” is a significant group, accounting
for 24.91%. No doubt, the public image of professors fits perfectly well
with the concept of “independent.” Professors are generally thought as
experts in their chosen field. Having professors on the board certainly
helps to enhance corporate image; however, as an interviewee pointed
out:
Although professors might not knowingly cover up for the firms, they usually
are not sophisticated enough to discover fraud.99

Another interviewee also questioned the ability of professors to
oversee public firms:

99. Interview with Anonymous Independent Director No. 3 (Sept. 30, 2008) (on
file with author), at 9.
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They [the professors] can only do the so-called “oversight” from the documents
given by the firm. In fact, they are incapable of doing any substantive oversight
because they do not have the business knowledge. Therefore, I think professors
being independent directors is a disaster for our society because they know so
little about what they are doing.100

Such statements further point out the limitation of professors being
independent directors. To be sure, most professors are not familiar with
business operations and if he or she is not a professor of finance or
accounting, then he or she may not have enough knowledge to even
understand financial statements, let alone discover fraudulent accounting
practices.101 An interviewee, who is a professor of engineering, admitted
that:
Reviewing financial reports is not my expertise . . . I am able to contribute more
towards devising the company’s strategy and its future direction. To be honest, I
don’t understand financial reports very well. I do not have a complete
understanding of the impact or the meaning of some of the specific numbers [on
the reports]. Other directors might be more knowledgeable about that. During
meetings, the directors would bring in aides, such as their chief financial officer to
discuss the company’s finance. From these discussions, I can more or less grasp
the overall picture of the company’s financial status. However, I would be
unable to discover any fraud by merely looking at the numbers.102

One might reasonably infer, and the reality might well be, that different
independent directors serve different functions. For instance, a professor
of engineering might contribute to the firm more on technical consultation
than on internal auditing improvement. In practice, firms will choose
directors who can contribute in some way to the firm. For example, evidence
shows that Japanese firms that tend to appoint retired government
bureaucrats as outside directors are those in the construction industry
and have significant business with government agencies.103

100. Interview with Anonymous Independent Director No. 31 (Nov. 5, 2009) (on
file with author), at 3.
101. In China, many economists or law professors serve as independent directors of
public companies. Commentators have also concerned about their lack of business
knowledge. Yang Chou & Chiang Kong, Woguo kaiban duli dongshi zeren baoxian
pingjing fenshi ji xianzhong sheji [Bottleneck Analysis and Policy Design for D&O
Insurance in China], Feb. 4, 2009, available at http://www.chinarm.cn/Insurance/
2009/0204/20572.html.
102. Interview with Anonymous Independent Director No. 22 (Feb. 25, 2009) (on
file with author), at 5.
103. Yoshiro Miwa & J. Mark Ramseyer, Who Appoints Them, What Do They Do?
Evidence on Outside Directors From Japan, 14 J. ECON. & MGMT. STRATEGY 299, 320–
21 (2005).
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B. What Are Their Duties?
In general, Taiwanese law requires independent directors to pay attention
to internal audit procedures, material corporate transactions, matters on
which directors or statutory supervisors have conflicts, securities offerings,
and the retention or dismissal of outside auditors or internal accounting,
financial, and auditing officers.104 However, independent directors do
not have veto rights to these decisions; they can only ask the board to
keep their dissenting opinion on file. Further, the board can still decide
by majority votes even if independent directors have dissenting opinions.
In practice, dissenting opinions from independent directors are rare.
Nevertheless, once the companies make such opinions public, the market
and government will watch carefully. Such opinions usually bear signaling
effects. For example, one interviewee (and only one), who serves in the
financial industry, reported that he once filed a dissenting opinion for the
appointment of the CEO of a subsidiary. Although a majority of the
board members voted for that candidate, the government authority in
charge of the financial industry asked the firm to reconsider the appointment
after reviewing the dissenting opinion. In the end, the firm withdrew the
appointment.105
The law requires independent directors to review matters in which a
director or statutory auditor bears a personal interests.106 In short, this
clause deals with self-dealing transactions pertaining to directors and
statutory auditors. Literally speaking, for public companies that have
independent directors, any matter that bears on the personal interests of
directors or statutory auditors should be approved by the board of
directors, and if independent directors have any opposing opinion, the
board minutes should record them. Therefore, the law does require
independent directors to participate in the review of RPTs with directors
or statutory auditors.

104. ZHENG QUAN JIAO YI FA [Securities and Exchange Act] art. 14-3 (2010)
(Taiwan), available at http://law.moj.gov.tw/eng/LawClass/LawAll.aspx?PCode=G0400001.
105. Interview with Anonymous Independent Director No. 25 (Mar. 1, 2009) (on
file with author), at 3–4.
106. Zheng Quan Jiao Yi Fa art. 14-3(3).
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C. What Do They Really Do?
Most of the independent directors I know actively participate in corporate
matters. However, their participation usually limits to attending all the board
meetings, actively participate in board meetings and reading materials in preparation
for the meetings. I think most of the independent directors just do that much. I
don’t think anyone would visit the firm if nothing comes up. And I don’t think
anyone would look into details of the pre-meeting materials.107

The above quote fairly reflects the reality of independent director
participation in Taiwan. The standard tasks of independent directors are
to attend board meetings, review meeting materials before the meeting,
and review internal audit reports every month. In general, board meetings
of firms in the financial industry are held once a month, while those in
other industries are usually held every two to three months. Most
interviewees admit that they did not spend much time reviewing materials
before the meeting. However, if attending the board meeting is the only
major task for independent directors, the effectiveness of board meetings
becomes crucial. Despite the fact that some independent directors are
just too busy to preview the materials,108 sometimes it is because firms
prefer not to provide all the detailed information outside the meeting for
confidentiality reasons.109 Nevertheless, the confidentiality concerns could
compromise the readiness of independent directors, who already are not
that familiar with daily corporate matters to effectively judge the fairness
of board decisions.
In addition to attending board meetings, independent directors in
Taiwan also review internal audit reports every month. 110 Although
some with accounting backgrounds pay more attention to the internal
control systems, most interviewees reveal that such a review is usually
cursory and superficial. Some directors might not even have a clue how
to review an internal audit report:

107. Interview with Anonymous Independent Director No. 4 (Oct. 07, 2008) (on file
with author), at 8.
108. See Interview with Anonymous Independent Director No. 29 (Oct. 21, 2009)
(on file with author), at 10.
109. See Interview with Anonymous Independent Director No. 30 (Oct. 22, 2009)
(on file with author). at 12.
110. GONG KAI FA HANG GONG SI JIAN LI NEI BU KONG ZHI ZHI DU CHU LI ZHUN
ZE YING [Regulations Governing Establishment of Internal Control Systems by Public
Companies] art. 15 (2009) (Taiwan), available at http://eng.selaw.com.tw/FLAWDAT
0201.asp.
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To be honest, I personally feel that the system of requiring independent
directors to review internal audit report does not achieve much of its goal. For
example, one company provides me with a report that lists every item as “no
material irregularity” every month. To be honest, I really don’t know what to
question further. On the other hand, the other company provides me with a very
detailed report about what the internal auditor found and what he plans to do.
My feeling is that on the one hand, I feel much better when I see the more
detailed report; on the other, I don’t know what to question because you already
handled all the issues.111

In addition to directors’ individual abilities, the independence and
ability of the internal auditor also influences the effectiveness of independent
directors in overseeing the internal control process. Traditionally, the
internal audit departments of most public companies in Taiwan are
supervised by general managers and thus are not as independent. However,
on December 19, 2005, the FSC of Taiwan revised the Regulations
Governing Establishment of Internal Control Systems by Public Companies
requiring the internal audit departments of all public companies to be
directly supervised by the board.112 The revision formally enhances the
status and independence of internal auditors, and provides a better
structure for internal auditors to ensure the functioning of the internal
control system.
However, when facing RPTs, most independent director interviewees
do not believe that internal auditors are able to be a check-and-balance to
controlling shareholders.113 After all, internal auditors are still employees.
To challenge a decision of your boss and to blow the whistle, you are
risking your entire career and that requires extraordinary courage. In
addition, internal auditors are not highly regarded in most Taiwanese
public companies; very few public companies have built a culture that
provides internal auditors the power and courage to challenge controlling
shareholders.114
In sum, the participation of independent directors is generally limited
to attending board meetings and reviewing monthly internal audit reports.
111. Interview with Anonymous Independent Director No. 26 (Oct. 12, 2009) (on
file with author), at 7–8.
112. Gong Kai Fa Hang Gong Si Jian Li Nei Bu Kong Zhi Zhi Du Chu Li Zhun Ze
Ying art. 11.
113. See Interview with Anonymous Independent Director No. 26 (Oct. 12, 2009)
(on file with author), at 12; Interview with Anonymous Independent Director No. 31
(Nov. 5, 2009) (on file with author), at 12.
114. See Interview with Anonymous Independent Director No. 31 (Nov. 5, 2009)
(on file with author), at 12.
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In companies that adopted the board committee system, independent
directors, as members of the audit committee, play a more active role in
overseeing the financial condition of the company. Nomination committee
and compensation committee are still few in Taiwan. In addition, since
the Taiwanese court has not adopted the business judgment rule and
deferred to the decisions of independent board committees in situations
involving conflicts of interest, such as mergers and acquisitions and
shareholder derivative suits, independent directors in Taiwan have not
played an active role in reconciling matters that involve conflicts of
interest. Therefore, the contribution of independent directors to the
company is less valued in Taiwan than in the United States.
D. Empirical Evidence on Related Party Transaction Oversight
From the analysis of RPTs in previous sections, we can reasonably
infer that sample firms have engaged in tunneling transactions with related
parties. If this is likely to be the case, shareholders will, of course, want
someone to stop these value-destroying transactions, and this person
should be the one who is independent from the controlling shareholders
(in the case of concentrated ownership) and can use their independent
judgment to review these transactions for the best interests of the
corporations.115 Independent directors presumably fit this criterion and
are considered to be a proper post to review conflict-of-interest transactions
impartially on behalf of minority shareholders under U.S. Delaware law.
However, a review of published board decisions of sample Taiwanese
firms reports stunningly opposing results (Table 9).
In 2007, when excluding decisions on RPTs with wholly-owned
subsidiaries, only nine boards of the sample firms (22%) ever reviewed
and decided on RPTs. These decisions involved asset swaps, equity
acquisitions, equity sales, and loans with related parties. Even among
these nine firms, only very few disclosed RPTs were reviewed by the
board. Apparently, trading relationships, renting relationships and cash
receipts from related parties were never reviewed by the sample boards.
Only a few firms submitted these RPTs for board review for asset
transfer and loans.

115. Lucian A. Bebchuk & Assaf Hamdani, The Elusive Quest for Global Governance
Standards 37–38 (Harvard Law & Econ., Discussion Paper No. 633, 2009), available at
http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=1374331; Pacces, supra note 14, at
44–49.
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TABLE 9
BOARD DECISIONS ON RELATED PARTY TRANSACTIONS

Report Decisions on RPTs

NO. OF FIRMS
16

Decisions not Available

5

No Decision on RPTs

20

Report Decisions on RPTs (excluding decisions
with regard to wholly-owned subsidiaries)

9

Interviews with independent directors further confirm this finding.
Only fifteen out of forty interviewees have reviewed RPTs in board
meetings. When asked about the types of RPTs they reviewed, ten recalled
loans or guarantees, two mentioned asset transfers, one mentioned equity
acquisition, and two mentioned sales and purchases of goods. None
mentioned renting and cash receipts relationships. Among the fifteen
interviewees, nine of them serve in financial firms where the law requires
their boards to review and approve RPTs with controlling shareholders or
chairpersons by super-majority vote.116 Three of the remaining six
interviewees who serve in non-financial firms only recalled reviewing
loan or guarantee RPTs where the law also requires the boards’ approval
or ratification.117 Therefore, independent directors’ participation in
monitoring RPTs is largely influenced by the laws and regulations
promulgated by the government.
One major area where the law does not require boards’ participation is
in RPTs that involve purchases and sales of goods and services—trading
RPTs. From previous analysis of sample RPTs, we know that trading
transactions are the most common sample RPTs. The majority of
trading RPTs are conducted with the controlling firms or the affiliated
firms of the sample firms. These intra-group transactions, while often
serving legitimate business purposes, might provide opportunities for
116. JING JUNG KONG GU GONG SI FA [FINANCIAL HOLDING COMPANY ACT] art. 45
(2006) (Taiwan), available at http://law.moj.gov.tw/eng/LawClass/LawAll.aspx?PCode
=G0380112.
117. See generally Regulations Governing Loaning of Funds and Making of
Endorsements/Guarantees by Public Companies (2010) (Taiwan), available at http://law.
moj.gov.tw/pdaeng/NewsContent.aspx?msgid=5087.
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dominate shareholders to transfer out corporate assets.118 However, the
vast majority of the sample firms’ boards have never reviewed trading
transactions with controlling or affiliated firms.
In one of the interviews where the listed company belongs to a famous
family-controlled group in Taiwan, the interviewee admitted that:
In terms of this business group, it has too many companies. I do not know the
exact relationships between each subsidiary or affiliate. And among group
companies, they all have some kind of business transactions. So I’m not that
clear about that.119

Indeed, the 2007 financial statement of this sample firm listed thirtyeight related parties (excluding wholly-owned subsidiaries), including
controlling firm, major shareholder of the controlling firm, chairman,
firms controlled by the chairman’s relatives, firms controlled by the
controlling firm, and affiliated firms of the sample firm. The transaction
types include asset transfer, sales of goods and services, cost sharing for
administrative support services, and loan guarantees. In addition, the
2007 annual report only reflects one board decision on increasing
investment in one of the wholly-owned subsidiaries. Even though the
interviewee has served on the board for more than five years, he did not
recall any experience in reviewing RPTs.
In addition to the complexity of RPTs, fierce market competition is
another reason provided by the interviewees for not reviewing the terms
of related-party trading transactions:
It’s not possible to have any deviation on pricing because if the price of a
specific product is above the market price, then we cannot get the order or [if
the sale price is too low,] our margin would be low. If the margin falls below
the normal range, everyone will pay attention to that. Therefore, there won’t be
any [tunneling] problem.120

The idea that market competition can serve as a monitor for trading
RPTs may work in a competitive industry where margins are relatively
low, for example, the personal computer industry. However, markets
change. A good corporate governance measure should not be altered
simply based on specific industry conditions. Furthermore, trading
relationships with either controlling firms or affiliated firms involve
conflicts of interests where independent directors should step in and

118. Pierre-Henri Conac et al., Constraining Dominant Shareholders’ Self-Dealing:
The Legal Framework in France, Germany, and Italy, 4 EUR. COMPANY & FIN. L. REV.
491, 495–96 (2007); Cheung et al., China, supra note 73, at 385–86.
119. Interview with Anonymous Independent Director No. 14 (Nov. 11, 2008) (on
file with author), at 8.
120. Interview with Anonymous Independent Director No. 13 (Oct. 30, 2008) (on
file with author), at 6.
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make decisions for the best interests of the corporation. 121 Although
independent directors may decide the level of monitoring based on
industry conditions, their participation is still essential in ensuring the
fairness of the transaction even if the product market is highly competitive
and thus the risks of deviation from market price is relatively low.
VI. OVERSEEING CONTROLLING SHAREHOLDERS:
MISSION IMPOSSIBLE?
A. Information Asymmetry
There exists a serious information asymmetry problem between
independent directors and controlling shareholders. An opinion leader in
Taiwan’s corporate governance policy, who has personally been involved in
a securities fraud lawsuit as an independent director, points to the weakness
of independent directors based on information asymmetry problem:
We (the independent directors) work on a meeting basis, on a gathering basis;
whereas the management team is there (at the company) 24 hours a day.
Therefore, there exists an unequal distribution of information (between the
independent director and the management team). The independent director
needs to adapt the company’s internal policy to ensure the correctness of the
transaction. However, if the company’s management team intentionally allows
fraud to exist in the process, the independent director has very incomplete
information. Because they (the management team) will not tell you (the
independent director). If this deal occurs overseas, in this case the independent
director’s ability (to detect fraud) is very weak. In an intentionally-fraudulent
deal, the independent director is at a very weak position. He does not have
information, the management cannot tell you.122

This interviewee tells us that when there is intentional fraud, there is
nothing an independent director can do because of an information
asymmetry problem. In this case, one might wonder why independent
directors would not dig further to uncover the fraud. Is it true that controlling
shareholders could hide everything from the eyes of independent directors?
An interviewee, who involves deeply in the corporate board reform in
Taiwan, shares the difficulties in “digging further:”

121. Bebchuk & Hamdani, supra note 115, at 37.
122. Interview with Anonymous Independent Director No. 20 (Feb. 19, 2009) (on
file with author), at 8.
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Independent directors invited by the controlling shareholders, including myself,
cannot really do what they want. . . . You’ll find that they (the controlling
shareholders) only want you to be the rubber stamp. . . . I worked very hard and
asked many questions. Of course, everyone will respect you and let you say
what you want to say. But when you ask too many questions, they do not know
what to do. Then they will start to screen or control the data they give you. In
the beginning, I will call those insiders I know and ask more questions. But in
the end, you’ll find that it’s very annoying and troublesome in terms of
maintaining relationship with people. So I think the role of independent directors is
very limited.123

Independent directors are at the very top of the corporate structure;
therefore, they need cooperation from the company to obtain information.
On the other hand, controlling shareholders control the information. In
particular, most controlling shareholders in Taiwan also manage
the company. In this case, these shareholder managers even produce the
information independent directors need. If shareholder managers
intentionally hold up or manipulate the information, then there is nothing
independent directors can do but resign. Of course, resignation of
independent director sends out a signal to the market. But in most cases,
the market still will not have a clear picture unless independent directors
have already obtained enough evidence about the fraud and made it public.
1. Related Party Transactions—The Hardest Part of All
Independent directors face even higher barriers in seeking information
about irregular RPTs. It is widespread among Asian countries that insiders
deliberately conceal abusive RPTs to the public to avoid scrutiny. 124
With the complex ownership structure of Asian companies, it is usually
hard to even identify “related parties” in the first place:125
I think the problem is not so much about whether the information is enough;
what’s more important is that the company did not tell you that this is a related
party transaction in the first place.126

When RPTs are disclosed, it is sometimes hard to decide whether the
terms are fair or abusive if there is no market price for comparison.127
123. The interviewee resigned after serving for less than a year as an independent
director in a family conglomerate. Interview with Anonymous Independent Director No.
31 (Nov. 5, 2009) (on file with author), at 4.
124. ORG. FOR ECON. CO-OPERATION & DEV., 2007 ASIAN ROUNDTABLE ON CORPORATE
GOVERNANCE, SYNTHESIS NOTE 6-7 (2007), available at http://www.oecd.org/document/
48/0,3343,en_2649_34813_39336752_1_1_1_1,00.html [hereinafter OECD 2007 ASIAN
ROUNDTABLE].
125. Id. at 7.
126. Interview with Anonymous Independent Director No. 26 (Oct. 12, 2009) (on
file with author), at 11.
127. OECD 2007 ASIAN ROUNDTABLE, supra note 124, at 7.
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Even if the management provides a market price, it is still possible that
the management would manipulate the information. For real estate or
share purchase, we also need a well-developed appraisal industry to
support the oversight needs. However, in many Asian countries, including
Taiwan, a fair appraisal industry is still under development.128
An ethical accounting profession is also necessary to enhance the
transparency of RPTs. In many tunneling cases in Taiwan, the controlling
shareholders colluded with outside accountants during the auditing
process to cover up abusive RPTs:
Honestly, perhaps because the Taiwanese society places more emphasis on
personal relations, if the transaction is made between related parties, some of the
accounting firms in Taiwan will help the company conceal related party transactions
during the auditing process. . . . They won’t report those transactions in the
official financial statements. What I mean by the concept of transactions made
between related parties is that, those transactions that I refer to are illegal
transactions between the company and those paper companies established by the
controlling shareholders, not those regular related party transactions.129

The 2006 Reba Group debacle exemplifies such collusion. The
accountant of the Reba Group, Si-Da Shan, not only did not correct the
omission of the disclosure of certain RPT, but also consciously deleted
Ho Hsin Company, one of the company’s controlled by the controlling
shareholder of the Reba Group, from the audit working paper prepared
by his assistant at the request of the controlling shareholder of the Reba
Group.130 Of course, such collusion requires cooperation from internal
legal and auditing departments. One interviewee admitted that he was
once aware of a potential tunneling RPT, but since the firm did not
specify the counterparty as a related party, he chose to trust the firm and
approved the transaction without actively verifying the information:

128. “Taiwan does not have a well-developed appraisal industry. There are some
appraisal companies in Taiwan providing real estate appraisal service. Some are ethical,
like China Credit Information Services Ltd., while most are not as ethical as long as you
pay. That’s very bad. Without the support of a fair appraisal industry, the legal requirement of
independent appraisal report for RPTs is useless.” Interview with Anonymous Independent
Director No. 34 (Nov. 27, 2009) (on file with author), at 16.
129. Interview with Anonymous Independent Director No. 5 (Oct. 9, 2008) (on file
with author), at 4.
130. Hsio-Ru Ma & Yi-Ting Ho, Shou Cha Zhe Wu Bi Yu Shen Ji Shi Bai—Li Ba
An Zhi Xing Si [Insider Fraud and Audit Failure—Rethinking the Case of Rebar Group],
261 ACCOUNTING RESEARCH MONTHLY 28, 41 (2007) [hereinafter Ma, Rebar Audit Failure].
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I myself have approved some related party transactions that are questionable. . . .
Many family businesses in Taiwan are conducting related party transactions . . .
Sometimes it’s hard to tell if the party is a related party or not. And we,
independent directors, would not verify whether the counter party is a related
party or not. . . . Even the legal department or internal audit department won’t
tell you whether it is a related party. If you ask them, they will tell you it is not
and then you will approve the transaction. But in fact, the counter party could
be an indirect related party. So I guess the internal audit department is also covering
up for the controlling shareholder.131

2. Passiveness
In reality, independent directors in Taiwan are helpless in overseeing
controlling shareholders, and are especially helpless in detecting unfair
RPTs and fraud. The unfavorable environment makes most of them
pessimistic about their ability to detect corporate fraud. They usually
view themselves as outsiders. As one interviewee, who used to serve as
a director in Procomp, which filed reorganization in 2004 because of
fraudulent accounting practices, stated:
I do not think independent directors are able to uncover fraudulent transactions
merely by viewing the company from an outsider’s standpoint. One has to either
work in the company or be very persistent in asking questions (like me), to find
out the truth. Otherwise, there’s no way of uncovering the truth.132

In addition to the outsider mentality, in reality, independent directors
may find it hard to access inside information. Such situations can be
worse in a concentrated ownership economy where the chairman usually
dominates the board and corporations tend to be less transparent. Taiwan’s
corporate environment is in exactly such a situation. Several interviewees
share the same feeling that in a situation where the chairman or the
corporation engages in fraudulent activities, independent directors are
not capable of discovering the truth:

131. Interview with Anonymous Independent Director No. 4 (Oct. 7, 2008) (on file
with author), at 9.
132. Interview with Anonymous Independent Director No. 18 (Feb. 18. 2009) (on
file with author), at 9. See also Interview with Anonymous Independent Director No. 19
(Feb. 19, 2009) (on file with author), at 10. “My personal feeling is that the (accounting)
records relating to tunneling or embezzlement are typically created by entry-level
employees. Frankly, if you are not an accounting employee or the chief financial officer,
I think your chances of discovering fraud in documents which falsify sales transactions,
invoices, and certificates is zero. For an outsider of the company like me, I think the
chances of me discovering fraud is definitely zero.”
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To be frank, if the chairman wants to hide something, the independent directors
will not know, right? After all, you [the independent directors] do not work in
the firm everyday. . . . Independent director is not an employee of the company.
What he does is just to question those issues that come up from the information
provided by the company. I believe that if the chairman wants to cover up any
wrongdoing and avoid any suspicion, he can do that.133

Such helplessness and pessimism also shapes the way independent
directors perceive themselves. Almost all of the interviewees regard
themselves as corporate monitors and recognize that their major
responsibility is to make sure board decisions comply with the law.
However, it is surprising that only six of them view themselves as being
the proper people to monitor RPTs. Others assign such tasks to other
constituencies because they think that they are outsiders and believe that
there is not enough information available to them to fairly judge the
RPTs:
Those (related party transactions) are typically very complicated. In addition,
independent directors merely play a small role in the whole business. Related
party transactions are typically associated with (major) shareholders’ interests. . . . I
think independent directors are outsiders and it’s hard for them to become
deeply involved. . . . If the management wants you to leave, you have no choice
but to leave.134

Apparently, public companies and independent directors in Taiwan
have not come to a consensus that an independent director is the proper
constituency to monitor RPTs. Most independent directors have yet to
recognize their role in solving conflicts of interest between controlling
shareholders and outside investors, especially in transactions with related
parties. Part of the reason may be that most Taiwanese companies do not
have a truly independent internal control department, which could help
independent directors identify related parties. The absence of an
independent internal control department makes independent directors feel
like outsiders who do not have access to crucial inside information about
related parties and transaction terms. In addition, without the capacity of

133. Interview with Anonymous Independent Director No. 5 (Oct. 9, 2008) (on file
with author), at 3, 5. See also Interview No. 3 (Sept. 30, 2008) (on file with author), at 6
(“I don’t think all the board members will cover up for wrong doings. Most of the board
members are knowledgeable of ethics and want this company to be well-managed.
However, if the CEO deliberately wants to do something that negatively impacts the
company, I don’t think the board would be able to stop him.”).
134. Interview with Anonymous Independent Director No. 9 (Oct. 15, 2008) (on file
with author), at 12.
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an audit committee, independent directors alone do not have resources to
initiate an investigation should they think that there might be problems
with certain transactions. Even if they do, the enormous amount of time
and effort they have to put in makes such investigation unattractive given
the limited time and financial incentives:
Honestly speaking, if they (the controlling shareholders) want to hide something
from you, they definitely can. . . . I do not have extra time to seek further
information unless someone already passed inside information to me or someone
sued the company. If you expect an independent director to actively dig out
problems inside the firm, first, I do not believe that independent directors have
the incentives to do that; second, without the assistance from public accountants
and lawyers, I do not believe that he has the time and ability to do that.135

B. Complementarities, Transplant Effect, and Camouflage
Berkowitz, Pistor, and Richard (2003) find that it is the readiness of
domestic communities to a new legal device, rather than the legal family
where the new legal device is from, that determines the success of legal
transplant and in turn economic development.136 Countries that receive
foreign legal systems without similar predispositions are much more
constrained in developing an effective legal system, and thus suffer from
the so-called “transplant effect.”137 Borrowing the legal institution of
“independent directors” alone from the United States incurs various
externalities on corporate governance in Taiwan.
Under traditional Taiwanese corporate law which originates from
Japan, the board of directors is a managing board, instead of a monitoring
board, and the oversight function is assigned to another internal
institution—the statutory supervisor.138 Hence, from the beginning, the
board is not meant to play a monitoring role. The institutional design of
the board of directors and statutory supervisors complement each other.
Complementarities could contribute to the path dependence of the
corporate structure in a given country.139
In practice, the internal governance function of statutory supervisors in
Taiwan is not efficient. The oversight function of statutory supervisors has
long been undermined, mainly because the statutory supervisors are also
135. Interview with Anonymous Independent Director No. 29 (Oct. 21, 2009) (on
file with author), at 3.
136. Daniel Berkowitz, Katharina Pistor & Jean-Francois Richard, Economic
Development, Legality, and the Transplant Effect, 47 EUR. ECON. REV. 165 (2003).
137. Id. at 168.
138. GONG SI FA [C OMPANY A CT ] art. 202 (2009) (Taiwan), available at http://
law.moj.gov.tw/eng/LawClass/LawAll.aspx?PCode=J0080001.
139. Lucian A. Bebchuk & Mark J. Roe, A Theory of Path Dependence in Corporate
Ownership and Governance, in CONVERGENCE AND PERSISTENCE IN CORPORATE GOVERNANCE
69, 80 (Jeffrey N. Gordon & Mark J. Roe eds., 2004).
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elected at the shareholders meeting, which is controlled by the controlling
shareholders. The way supervisors are elected results in the dependence
of supervisors to controlling shareholders, which leads to the failure of
internal governance.140
The long malfunctioning of local governance system provides an
opportunity to transplant U.S. style independent director and board
committee systems to Taiwan. Nonetheless, the operation of U.S. board
committee system also complements other existing local attributes, such
as diffuse ownership structure and the deference of judicial review to the
decisions of independent board committees.141 Without transplanting all
remaining complementary institutions, it is no surprise to find that the
new legal institution did not fully integrate into the existing system.142
Japan also experiences such transplant effect when introducing the board
committee system.143
The friction between independent directors and existing local institutions
is most apparent in companies who, on the one hand, introduce the new
institution, and on the other, preserve the existing institution of statutory
supervisors—37.06% of TSE-listed companies adopted such strategy.144
Both institutions are designed to serve the oversight function but with
very different complementary institutions. Such regulatory reform strategy
puts independent directors in a managing board without granting them a
platform (board committee) to exercise the tasks needed to oversee the
board. Yet in the meantime, independent directors are assigned tasks
that are of an oversight nature and are expected to serve as a voice for

140. Ming-Jye Huang, Gong Si Jan Kong Yu Jan Cha Ren Jye Du Gai Ge Ren
[Innovation of Taiwan’s Corporate Auditor System—A Corporate Governance Perspective],
29 NATIONAL TAIWAN UNIV. L.J. 159, 194 (2000) (Opposing the introduction of independent
directors and purporting to strengthen the independence and monitoring function of
statutory supervisors).
141. See Lin, supra note 11, at 904–12.
142. Gilson, supra note 94, at 339.
143. Gilson & Milhaupt, supra note 84, at 369–72.
144. As of March 2011, 318 TSE-listed companies have at least one independent
director and only thirty-six companies established audit committees and abolished the
institution of statutory supervisors. There are a total of 761 TSE-listed companies as of
March 2011. See Summary Data of Stock Market, TAIWAN STOCK EXCH., available at
http://www.twse.com.tw/ch/statistics/statistics_list.php?tm=04&stm=004; Market
Observation Post System, TAIWAN STOCK EXCH., available at http://mops.twse.com.tw/
mops/web/t93sb05 and http://mops.twse.com.tw/mops/web/t135sb02 (last visited May 5,
2011).
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minority shareholders.145 However, the law still requires the pre-existing
statutory supervisors to perform their oversight job. The failure of
independent directors to oversee controlling shareholders as found by
this paper exemplifies the “transplant effect” coined by Berkowitz, Pistor,
and Richard (2003).
In addition, introducing a new legal device to a local environment
without corresponding complementarities could contrarily cloud the true
face of corporate governance. In Taiwan, all newly listed companies,
public financial firms, and large listed firms, are required by the law to
have independent directors.146 However, although all independent directors
meet the legal definition of “independence,” the true independence of
most independent directors is highly dubious. Furthermore, Taiwanese
courts have not established a practice of ex post judicial review of the
independence of directors in board decisions that involve conflicts of
interests. Hence, in some way, the new legal institution serves as a
camouflage for bad corporate governance. Even some companies that do
not honor corporate governance will strive to have independent directors
on their board in order to mislead the public.
Companies with bad corporate governance retain independent directors to
camouflage the truth.147 Investors could not know the true independence
of directors merely from their resumes.148 Similar concerns were expressed
towards the corporate board reform in Japan. Gilson and Milhaupt (2005)
write:

145. ZHENG QUAN JIAO YI FA [SECURITIES AND EXCHANGE ACT] art. 14-3 (2010)
(Taiwan), available at http://law.moj.gov.tw/eng/LawClass/LawAll.aspx?PCode=G0400001.
146. Financial Supervisory Commission, supra note 91.
147. The controlling shareholder of Universal ABIT, Yu-Tsun Lu, started tunneling
corporate assets through hundreds of paper companies from 2002. In 2002, he invited
advisors of his thesis for the executive master program, who are famous business
professors on corporate governance, to serve as independent director and statutory
supervisor respectively. In the latter half of 2004, rumors about Mr. Lu’s involvement in
tunneling Universal ABIT were widespread and one of his advisors resigned from the
post of independent director in October 2004. The scandal erupted at the end of 2004 and
Mr. Lu was charged with several crimes and sentenced to 20 years of imprisonment in
May 2007. Sho-De Hu, Sheng-Ji Bi An Fu Ze Ren Qiu Xing 20 Nang [Universal ABIT
Scandal: CEO Was Indicted For 20 Years], LIBERTY TIMES, May 31, 2007, available at
http://shenyun.epochtimes.com/b5/7/5/31/n1727895.htm.
148. Interview with Anonymous Independent Director No. 31 (Nov. 5, 2009) (on
file with author), at 9 (“I think in many ways, it’s worse than when we didn’t have any
corporate governance concept. . . . In the past, people have better ideas about what this
organization is doing. Now you force everyone to put on the uniforms. In this way,
people instead cannot see your true face.”).
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Thus, without the complement of exacting ex post judicial review, the new
committee system—in tandem with the Code’s expansive definition of outside
director—could actually become a potent new governance technology
for stakeholder tunneling and managerial entrenchment.149

Therefore, the transplant effect not only affects the efficiency of
the transplanted legal institution but also extends externalities on the
whole society.
VII. CONCLUSION
One of the most important challenges to modern corporate governance
is to constrain controlling shareholders from tunneling corporate
resources at a cost to non-controlling shareholders. This paper serves an
initial attempt to empirically assess the extent to which independent directors
in Taiwan constrain tunneling. RPTs have been proved by empirical
studies as a major channel for tunneling. OECD has also stressed the
challenge of abusive RPTs to Asian corporate governance.
Nevertheless, the results are daunting. RPTs among Taiwanese public
companies are common but rarely monitored by the board. Overall,
independent directors’ oversight on RPTs or tunneling is generally weak.
In addition, most RPTs sent for board review are explicitly required by
the law to do so. The law plays a decisive role in constraining RPTs.
Self-regulation by firms of self-dealing transactions is rare.
The participation of independent directors in Taiwan is limited. The
value of independent directors in reconciling conflicts of interest matters
has not been recognized by Taiwanese public companies. The existence
of statutory supervisors further weakens the monitoring function of
independent directors. Furthermore, there exists tremendous information
asymmetry between independent directors and controlling shareholders,
in particular, the shareholder managers. The information needed to uncover
abusive RPTs is among the hardest to obtain.
To be sure, Taiwan’s capital market needs more transparency and
better enforcement of related regulations in conflicts of interest matters
that jeopardize the interests of minority shareholders. This includes a
more detailed financial disclosure on RPTs and a call for public companies
to revamp their internal procedures to prevent unfair dealings. How to
structure the tasks of independent directors and statutory auditors in
149.

Gilson & Milhaupt, supra note 84, at 371.
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conflicts of interest matters is also an important issue for companies that
have both legal institutions.
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